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1 Introduction 
Context is everything in Nigeria’s complex
economic, social, and environmental systems.
Agricultural development faces major challenges
including a very large and rapidly growing
population (140 million plus), a growing scarcity
of cultivable land, urbanisation, changing food
preferences, and dynamic internal markets.
Projected into the future, these trends raise many
questions for policymakers. Nigeria is the giant
of West Africa and its trajectories seem likely to
be replicated in other countries (OECD 2000).
In this article, we first summarise the agrarian
policy dilemma facing Nigeria, and then provide a
short narrative of an experiment in large-scale
farming in the ‘middle belt’ (Kwara State). We
then focus on an associated programme of youth
farming that is intended to build a bridge
between it and the small-scale peasant farming
which still employs an overwhelming majority of
rural Nigerians, and still feeds the nation with its
major food staples (yams, cassava, sorghum, pearl
millet and maize). Scale and technology,
organisation and marketing play critical roles. We
identify an emerging ‘generation gap’ in the
agricultural labour force, and ask whether youth
farming is a competent candidate for transferring
the responsibility of feeding the nation in the
next generation.
2 The dilemma of agrarian policy
2.1 A brief history
Agrarian policy has been a critical issue in
Nigerian economic development since the
imposition of colonial rule at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Small-scale peasant
farming has been at the centre. Following
independence in 1960, public policy increasingly
focused on ‘modernisation’, which, it was
believed, could increase rural incomes and
productivity (Helleiner 1966; Forrest 1993;
Mustapha and Meagher 2000). However, the
desired transformation remained elusive, and
the search intensified for ways of achieving food
security at the national level.  
From the 1970s onwards, an oil boom in Nigeria
decoupled food production from demand, by
making it possible to import cheap food from
abroad – a strategy which still continues.
Meanwhile agricultural exports (groundnuts,
cotton, cocoa and palm oil) lost their competitive
edge in world markets owing to an overvalued
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currency. It is not surprising that there was ‘a
pervasive feeling at the time that the country
was on the cusp of an agrarian crisis’ (Mustapha
and Meagher 2001). One federal intervention
followed another yet failed either to bring about
the desired ‘modernisation’ of agriculture or to
slow down a growing exodus of labour to the
cities. Projections of food deficits were made by
various experts – one study predicted a deficit of
6.6 million tons of grain equivalent by 1985. Yet
as records later showed, Nigerian farmers ‘were
to confound these experts and undermine their
scientific pretensions’ (Forrest 1993, cited in
Mustapha and Meagher 2001). 
After the introduction of structural adjustment
policies in 1986, negative perceptions of the
performance of the agricultural sector persisted,
influenced by the volume of food commodity
imports and the high prices of fertilisers.
However, according to FAOSTAT data, food
production kept up with the rate of population
growth through the 1990s, not only of yams and
cassava (which did extremely well) but even of
millet and sorghum, which increased from as
early as 1978, though more slowly. Evidence from
FAO statistics suggests that in West Africa, even
under conditions of low and erratic rainfall, the
production of food commodities has kept up with
population growth in the long term.1 During this
period, the food commodity markets in Nigeria,
driven by urbanisation, were strong (Ariyo et al.
2001). But there was (and still is) much poverty,
reducing demand. The best construction of these
data, it has been argued, is that demand rather
than supply factors constrain output at the
macro-scale, especially where smallholder
economies lack export markets for staple foods
(Mortimore 2003).
Nigerian agrarian policy, since early colonial
times, had been predicated on small-scale
peasant farming with two goals: subsistence
production (or food security) and a marketable
‘surplus’ – originally for export – for which
economic incentives were provided. Continuing
belief that this strategy is failing has engendered
increasing interest in alternative ways of
promoting new technologies that are popularly
considered to be more ‘efficient’. The new policy
strategy (especially in Kwara State) is to make
access to land and credit easier for individuals or
corporations using industrial/commercial farm
technologies. The necessary subsidies and
privileges can be managed better where there is
a ‘bankable’ agricultural project (in other words,
transferring agriculture from the informal to the
formal sector). Much faith is placed in the
technologies of commercial agriculture
spreading across the country from the enclaves
currently being created.2 This is despite the fact
that the World Bank is now emphasising making
smallholder agriculture more commercially
oriented (World Bank 2007). 
The implication is that the state has a pivotal
role to play in the growth and sustainability of
commercial agriculture (Daramola 2010). This is
particularly the case in developing countries,
where tenure systems may impede access to
large tracts of land, infrastructure is
rudimentary and commercial banks are jittery
about providing support for agriculture. The
activities of the Kwara State government in
promoting commercial agriculture reflect these
requirements. 
2.2 Agrarian livelihoods
Farming is not a closed system, but from the
perspective of rural families, it competes with
off-farm income opportunities, especially those
accessed through short- or longer term
migration. Long ago, such mobility became a
feature of rural life, attracting youths in
particular because their parents had year-round
commitments at home. The movement of labour
and capital between regions and countries
characterised economic development in the West
African region (Mabogunje 1972). For example,
landless young men from densely populated
districts migrated to centres of export
agriculture as tenant farmers (Udo 1975). In
semi-arid areas, with a long dry season, and
where variable rainfall caused unpredictable
crop yields, migration towards the coastal
centres had long supported family incomes
(Rouch 1956; Prothero 1959). In the drought
cycles of the 1970s and 1980s, migration enabled
access to new opportunities created by the oil
boom in Nigeria (Mortimore 1989). Young people
were attracted to off-farm incomes, urban jobs,
and opportunities that their education (which
their parents had not enjoyed) brought within
their reach. Even those lacking modern
education could participate in migratory job-
seeking in the urban informal sector, through a
natural evolution of the short-term (or ‘circular’)
migrations of the past.
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It is in this broader context of livelihood
aspirations that Nigeria’s agri-food sector evolved
in the later decades of the twentieth century.
Although generalisation is risky, it may be said
that most food commodity production remained
in the hands of a slowly ageing population of
farmers (women or men), using hand technology,
conserving indigenous knowledge, and relying on
family labour. In some parts of the country,
shortages of farm labour were noted (e.g. in
Kwara State, which was within easy reach of the
rapidly growing urban centres in the south-west,
and in some hilly districts where much labour is
required to maintain soil conservation
structures). At the same time, educated young
people (women as well as men) came to despise
rural life with its hard and dirty work, and low
rewards. Thus the generation gap, supported by a
negative attitude, has come to threaten the food
security of the nation.
The dilemma for agrarian policy has thus been
enlarged from a search for appropriate
technologies with which to facilitate the
‘modernisation’ of small-scale peasant farming,
to the challenge of transferring the food-
producing sector from an ageing and mostly poor
farm population to a new generation of
producers. To do this, new attitudes as well as
new technologies, and greater investment
finance, are needed in the sector. 
Fundamental drivers of this transformation will
be demographic. Besides the ageing (and
retirement) of an increasing proportion of the
existing farm population, as already noted, we
may expect, as a consequence of prevalent high
human fertility and the falling child mortality
experienced in the first stage of the
‘demographic transition’, a huge increase in job
seekers (a ‘demographic dividend’ if they can be
found productive employment). We may also
expect a slowing and eventual decline of rural
population growth, as a majority of the
population becomes urbanised. Estimates of the
level of urbanisation in Nigeria (defining ‘urban’
as settlements with 20,000 or more inhabitants)
vary widely from a UN estimate of 49 per cent to
a more modest, research-based estimate of
30 per cent, which reflects a falling off in urban
population growth in recent years (Potts 2012).3
The alternative to modernising small-scale
agriculture is to replace it with large-scale
commercial farming, targeting the growing
numbers of urban consumers, and benefiting
from rising global prices of food commodities.
Advocates of prioritising small-scale agriculture
point to higher average yields per hectare
achieved in labour-intensive systems (predicted
by Boserup 1965), supposed more efficient use of
production factors through self-employment on
one’s own fields, and the beneficial linkages
between agriculture and other sectors of the
economy through multiplier effects (Mellor
1995). Since poverty is deepest in rural areas, its
reduction there will have the greater impact.
Advocates of large-scale farming throw doubt on
the data and methods used to support
productivity and efficiency gains, and point to
the advantages of large scale in obtaining and
using capital, knowledge, insurance, mass
marketing, etc. (Collier and Dercon 2009).
A renewed interest in large-scale agriculture in
Nigeria reflects, among other things, deregulated
agricultural markets favoured by current economic
policy, the large amounts of private investment
capital available in the country (seen in, for
example, road transport, commodity importation,
food processing plants), and energetic advocacy at
international level, as well as frustration with the
poor results of many interventions intended to
boost the small-scale sector. Moreover, the arrival
of the ‘superfarm’ – a foreign lease on vast areas of
allegedly ‘unoccupied’ land in order to produce
food (or other commodities) for export to the
investing country – has added to the renewal of
interest in large-scale farming. 
Again, agriculture needs to be understood in
context. In the transformation of the industrial–
urban countries in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the surplus labour created
by large-scale agricultural systems was absorbed
– if at a cost – by the new industrial enterprises,
themselves labour-intensive. In tropical Africa,
fledgling industries are few, they have been
adversely affected by global recession and other
factors, and technologies are no longer labour-
intensive. The choice of an agricultural
development strategy cannot ignore its
employment implications. It will depend on
balancing priorities for the sector between filling
consumers’ mouths on the one hand and
supporting producers’ livelihoods on the other.
These considerations are relevant in Nigeria,
where the demographics are especially compelling.
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2.3 Kwara State 
The government of Kwara State is carrying out an
experimental development with 13 Zimbabwean
farmers at Shonga, adjacent to the River Niger.
The stated purpose of the ‘experiment’ (as the
government calls it) is to test the feasibility of
large-scale technologies and production systems in
Nigerian conditions. Large-scale farming is not
unknown in Nigeria, though little analysis of the
scattered and diverse projects is available. But a
high level of interest in acquiring title to large
agricultural holdings, on the part of individuals
and corporations, suggests potential for
replication if the experiment is successful. 
However, the state government has not
abandoned a small-scale modernisation strategy
for agriculture, and has committed itself to
several programmes, including a ‘back to the land’
initiative for young people which was a failure.
The initiation of the Shonga ‘experiment’, which
receives various forms of government support, has
been followed by popular demand for support of
technological change at smallholder scale. One
scheme is specifically linked to the Shonga
‘experiment’ – setting aside some land, and
providing some training (in which the large-scale
farmers will participate), for selected and
financially assisted local young people.
3 The Shonga Farms in Nigeria – narrative of an
intervention
In 2004 Governor Bukola Saraki of Kwara State,
with political support from the Federal
Government of Nigeria, and diplomatic support
from the British government, invited a five-man
delegation from the Commercial Farmers’ Unions
of South Africa and Zimbabwe for a one-week fact-
finding visit to his state. The visit, which was paid
for by the Kwara State government, led to the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) between Kwara State and the Zimbabwean
farmers. A year later, 13 farmers arrived at Shonga
to take up long leases, each of 1,000 hectares, for
commercial (large-scale) farming (see Figure 1). 
The key components of the MoU commit the
Kwara State government to provide (i) suitable
land close to the River Niger to facilitate year-
round farming through irrigation,
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Figure 1 Land allocation plan for the Shonga experiment
Source Kwara State Ministry of Lands and Surveys.
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(ii) infrastructure such as access roads to the
farms and electricity, (iii) access to funds, and
(iv) assistance to the farming enterprises in
obtaining from the federal authorities a pioneer
status, which brings exemptions from import
duties on agricultural equipment and from taxes
on turnover. There are three obligations of the
commercial farmers in the MoU. They are
expected to (i) incorporate each farm enterprise
with US$80,000 share capital, (ii) contribute 1 per
cent of their gross turnover to a community trust
fund, and (iii) provide instruction at least once a
month in the state farm training institute in
Shonga (and later, Malete).
The land which was allocated to the new arrivals
was a patchwork of arable fields, long (‘bush’)
fallows and unused woodland, with scattered
small villages. In addition to the 13,000 hectares
leased to the commercial farmers, an additional
4,656 hectares were acquired for compensation
of local farmers who lost land and for setting up
‘model commercial farms’ for individuals
nominated by the Emir of Shonga. Compensation
in cash and kind (bicycles and inputs) was paid to
1,990 claimants. The villages, however, were not
affected, and no one had to move residence; a
‘buffer zone’ of 500m radius around each
preserved the rights of cultivators (see Figure 1).  
The 13 farms were partially cleared, supplied
with road and electricity infrastructure, and
organised into enterprises specialising in poultry
(four farms), dairying (four farms) and crops
only (five farms). The first farming season was in
2006. By 2011 broiler chicken pens, an abattoir
and dressing plant, milk processing and storage
had been built, with a sideline in yoghurt
production. Cattle breeding had commenced,
and sprinkler irrigation had been partially
completed on one farm. Cassava processing into
fufu (flour for retailing) was planned. The major
crops tried thus far included soyabeans, maize,
sorghum, cowpeas and cassava. Rice
development was held up by the lack of irrigation
equipment. Houses, farmyards and sheds for
crop and equipment storage had been designed
and constructed by the farmers themselves.
Access to bank loans guaranteed by the Kwara
State government was critically important as
none of the farmers were able to bring capital
from Zimbabwe. The state government mobilised
equipment to assist with the removal of large
trees. However, land clearance stopped at about
50 per cent of the intended cropped area, and to
achieve an adequate threshold of profitability, a
larger cultivated fraction is required. Loans for
this and for other expansion have been slow to
come, especially for enterprises for field crops,
which are the least viable, because it has not been
possible to date to realise the potential for rice
production. In 2011, three of the five banks in the
consortium were classified as ‘distressed’ by the
Central Bank of Nigeria, sharply worsening the
capital supply for that season. The recruitment of
an additional bank, with experience of
agricultural lending in South Africa, is hoped to
alleviate the financial situation in 2012. 
All the products are sold in Nigerian markets.
Broiler chicken capacity of 100,000 per month is
directed to chain eateries, mainly in Lagos; the
milk is sold to a powdered milk processor in
Lagos; yoghurt is sold locally and in the state
capital, Ilorin; soyabeans and the grain crops are
partly fed to livestock (maize, sorghum and
cowpeas) and partly sold outside Shonga; and
cassava demand was initially buoyant in southern
Nigeria including a buyer from the south-east
who planned to build a processing plant nearby,
to reduce transportation costs. 
However, notwithstanding the relatively equable
climate of the Southern Guinea Savanna agro-
ecological zone, risk exposes some enterprises
beyond the apparent capacity of the banks to
underwrite. A sudden downturn in the cassava
market in 2011 has left at least one producer with
unsold, rotting crops in the field, and a shortage
of rainfall in mid-season damaged the maize crop.
The soils are less fertile than initially assessed,
and maize has not responded well; some dairy
producers prefer to buy fodder maize from local
farmers. Poultry enterprises are doing best, but
the costs of running highly sophisticated, air-
conditioned plant are adversely affected by
electricity outages, when generators have to be
used. Farmers compound the chicken feeds
themselves, and use the best available day-old
chicks (from a hatchery in Ibadan, 220km away)
to obtain maximum growth rates. Milk producers
suffered losses when flooding closed down the
Lagos processing plant for a month in 2011.4
4 Youth farming 
The pursuit of large-scale commercial agriculture
by the Kwara State government in recent years is
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predicated on the notion that the pathway to
socioeconomic development is to create a class of
commercial farmers who will utilise the large
expanse of arable land and equitable climate with
which Kwara State is endowed. It all began with
the electioneering campaign promise which Dr
Bukola Saraki made in 2003 when he was seeking
to be elected governor. When he won the election,
he was immediately confronted by a horde of
unemployed and restless young people who had to
be turned into ‘useful citizens’. So, in his first
year as governor, he initiated a ‘back-to-the-land’
programme involving setting aside large tracts of
land in many locations across Kwara State, and
the provision of loans for land clearance and
procurement of improved seeds, fertilisers and
agrochemicals. But was this what the youth wanted? 
Most of the targeted young people did not turn up
to claim their entitlements. Instead, a few farmers
and many non-farmers got the package incentives
and re-sold them outside Kwara State. The overall
performance of the ‘back-to-the-land’ programme
was rated very poor at the end of the first year. 
Many of the 300 young people who were the
target of the scheme had never farmed before or
had been off the farm for a long time. So it was
no surprise that they did not respond to an
agricultural scheme based – as they saw it – on
hoe-and-cutlass technology. A new programme of
youth empowerment through agriculture was
launched which aims to train young people in all
aspects of commercial farming. Two such training
centres have been established, one in Shonga
itself, and the other in Malete, further south in
Kwara State. After the training, Kwara State
promises to assist the young farmers to gain
access to bank credit, and land, in their respective
local government areas. These young people are
expected to become the backbone of commercial
agriculture in the state. The programme has not
yet been thoroughly assessed.
5 Financial and land constraints in youth farming
Finance is the major constraint, and unless they
have advocates in the administration, the young
farmers have great difficulties in accessing the
loans to which they are supposed to be entitled.
Some trained young farmers (five per Local
Government Area (LGA)) who had already
obtained land, and were guaranteed by very senior
state civil servants, got financial assistance
(US$1,333 each) in 2010. Financial allocations to
trained young farmers which were captured in the
2010 budget were rolled over into the 2011
budget. It was expected that an intervention by
the federal government and the Central Bank of
Nigeria through a ‘commercial agricultural credit
scheme’ would materialise. Some money from this
scheme came to Kwara State late in 2011; and
disbursements were made to some trained young
farmers who belong to registered cooperatives
(US$1,994 per farmer). There is a provision for
young farmers in the 2012 budget proposal.
No specific financial mobilisation by the state
government through LGAs has been made. A
controversial LGA/state government joint
account system is a major constraint to LGAs,
which complain that they could execute more
development projects if their allocations from
the federation accounts go directly to them. 
Without the state government’s intervention,
access to land may be a problem in some LGAs.
In Shonga, however, the land for nominated
young farmers to open community ‘model
commercial farms’ has already been acquired by
the government (see Figure 1, farms 14 and 15).
To acquire land for any purpose, the state
governor has to invoke the Land Use Act of 1978,
under which suzerainty is vested in him, and
compensation has to be paid for any
improvements on the land. Due process must be
effected. To accommodate the young farmers in
locations scattered about the state, costly
procedures and delays are inevitable.
It follows from these constraints that both the
scale and the momentum of the youth farming
schemes are insufficient for them to fulfil the
role of new technology users and diffusers.
Furthermore, the dependence of trained young
farmers on external sources of financial support
is proportionately as great as that of the large-
scale commercial farmers. It appears that no
attempt has been made to involve the
commercial banks in youth farming schemes.
There is no enabling law to which young farmers
can have recourse when denied access to
farmland. Waiting for customary inheritance of
family farms is unacceptable. It seems clear that
without a legal enactment (within the provisions
of the Land Use Act), to entitle young farmers to
hold land on a long lease, the state government
will not be able to accelerate the youth farming
programme.
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Most of the nearly 300 young men and women
trained under the ‘youth empowerment
programme’ have thus not yet enjoyed the support
(in land and credit entitlements) that was
promised them by the state. The ‘community
model commercial farm’ scheme at Shonga has not
taken off. No land has been allocated to anyone
from the 1,200 hectares set aside for this purpose.
Off-the-record comments among state officials
imply that there are no interest groups at the state
or local level pushing for the implementation of the
programme. Thus it appears that the potential for
uptake of new technology in other parts of Kwara
State is in jeopardy. 
6 From context to content
Land use in northern Nigeria is variable from
place to place and constantly changing. In three
states, representing a range of population
densities, land use data show increasing areas
under cultivation (see Table 1).5 The general
direction of conversion was from uncultivated to
extensive cultivation and from extensive
cultivation to intensive cultivation, with a strong
correlation with population density. 
Extensive (‘shifting’) cultivation is normally
introduced on land belonging to the community
or to the family. Conversion to intensive
cultivation is done on land which is securely held
through inheritance, purchase, allocation or
prior use. When the supply of new land was
abundant, the strategy was to expand output by
taking in more farmland. There was a rapid
response to the demand for export crops. In
many (though not yet all) areas, there is little
unclaimed land remaining. Intensification is an
imperative. But it requires capital; as family
members depart for the city, labour has to be
hired, and as soil nutrients are steadily taken
away, compensating inputs must be purchased.
Thus, agriculture is becoming less to do with
subsistence and more of a business. And this
means that finance is a major driver throughout
the sector, to an extent not experienced before.
This is relevant to both large-scale farming and
youth farming.
Youth farming, and agricultural development in
general, are embedded in the complex, interactive
system that is modern Nigeria. Rural population
growth means more labour or skills as well as more
consumers. Urbanisation, however, means less
rural labour or skills but even more consumers.
That Nigeria has already urbanised to the extent of
30 per cent6 of its massive population (Potts 2012)
represents an unprecedented opportunity for the
commercialisation of the sector – with rising
commodity prices motivating investment in new
technologies. There is a danger that governments
will become stuck in outdated paradigms and find
themselves unable to adapt policy to such rapid
change. One has only to observe the burgeoning
roadside food markets all over the federation to be
convinced of both the achievements of, and the
opportunities for commercial participation. Yet the
clamour continues for help from the public sector –
more fertilisers, petrol subsidies – reflecting a
contradictory attitude of dependency.
Kwara State seems to be pursuing three models
of developing commercial agriculture. The first,
and newest, is the high-profile, subsidised, large-
scale commercial farm model in Shonga, which is
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Table 1 Changes in land use classes in three northern Nigerian states, from 1976/8 to 1993/5 (per cent of total area)
Category Adamawa Jigawa Kano
Intensive rain-fed agriculture from 23 to 22 from 37 to 69 from 86 to 87
Extensive rain-fed agriculture from 25 to 30 from 39 to 6 from 3 to 10
Flood plain agriculture from 1 to 3 from 8 to 10 from 1 to 2
Uncultivated (grass, shrubs, from 49 to 41 from 15 to 12 from 8 to 9
trees, wetland)
Others from 2 to 4 from 1 to 3 from 2 to 2
State population density 57 (= low) 121 (= medium) 274 (= high)
(sq km in 1993)
Source Geomatics International (1998).
also being replicated around the state.7 Whether
this model can succeed without government
subsidies remains to be seen. The second model
involves training young people and empowering
them with state support to become commercial
farmers. Because of the political capital invested
in this programme, a link with the Shonga
commercial farms was built into its design. Land
was allocated for nominated young farmers, and
provision for training by the commercial farmers
was included in the Shonga MoU. The third is the
old model of providing a modicum of incentives,
such as subsidised inputs, to smallholder farmers
and leaving them to their own devices to move
agriculture forward. It is not uncommon to hear
contempt for this strategy or at best an official
nonchalance about its capacity to achieve
transition (or revolution) in agriculture. Such
attitudes originate probably in its inability so far
to produce rapid productivity growth. In Shonga,
some technology transfer – and informal shared
learning – with the commercial farmers is taking
place: for example, soyabean is being adopted by
smallholders, and cattle breeding methods
exchanged with a pastoralist group.
Youth farming will not provide a resolution of the
policy dilemma without stronger backing in the
political economy of Kwara State. Not only are
these three models contesting the state’s
resources, but there are strong economic and
political interests involved. Young people are
seen as a consistently underperforming element
in the landscape of rural development. Efforts to
realise their potential go back to the farm
settlements (inspired by the Israeli kibbutzim) in
the former Western Region during the 1960s
(FAO 1966). Is it because the wrong paradigm
(modernisation through technological transfer)
is receiving all the emphasis? Or is it due to half-
hearted political commitment to remodelling the
incentive structure? 
There is a sharp paradox in the disdainful attitude
held towards agriculture by many Nigerian young
people on the one hand, and the enthusiasm for
entrepreneurial activity evident in markets, value
chains, spatial interaction, cities, and households
on the other. Agricultural education has
traditionally stressed science and technology, at
all levels. What does an agriculture graduate
expect to live by? Informal enquiries show that
very many expect to end up behind a desk, not
farming. There is therefore an urgent need to re-
examine the place of entrepreneurship in
agricultural training (Falola 2008). In a modern
free market economy, to continue expanding
public sector employment is anachronistic. For an
inexperienced graduate to offer advice to a
middle-aged farmer-entrepreneur is absurd. And
it was shown many years ago that older farmers
are more, not less innovative – because they know
the markets and can afford to invest (Tiffen
1976). Reference was made earlier to the
possibility that limited demand, not supply, forms
the biggest impediment to agricultural
development. This hypothesis is supported
elsewhere, as helping to explain why the Asian
green revolution has not taken off in Africa
(Djurfeldt et al. 2004). If so, how long must we
wait for the ‘demographic dividend’ to express
itself through improved incomes and more
efficient markets? Value chains, institutions, and
supporting infrastructure need to be prioritised in
West African development policy (Bolwig et al.
2009). Young people (as we have suggested) may
find such an approach more relevant to their
needs and aspirations.
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Notes
1 FAOSTAT, Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations,
faostat.fao.org (accessed 26 August 2012).
2 Large-scale farming is not new to Nigeria,
however. Individuals (including a former
president) and corporations (such as breweries)
have been accumulating land through purchase
and grants from state governments for many
years.
3 Urban populations are notoriously difficult to
estimate owing to poor census records and
volatile movements.
4 The Shonga experiment has attracted much
interest; see, for example Mustapha
(forthcoming). 
5 An anomalous trend in Kano State reflects
the impact of urbanisation and speculation in
land after cultivation peaked in the 1970s. For
more detail, see Mortimore and Turner
(2005). 
6 The UN estimate is 49 per cent.
7 Eighteen projects varying in size from 11 to
15,000ha are registered with the Kwara State
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Large-scale farming projects are
found in other states, including Nassarawa.
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